NOTES
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES REGULATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The development of the fishing' industry of the world during the past two
decades has been marked by an impressive and far reaching rate of growth and
by a diversified array of technological advances. Among the most notable
achievements since World War II is the skyrocketing climb of Peru from
anonymity among the fishing nations to the position of the world's leading fish
producer.' Also worthy of note are the strides taken by the Japanese fishing
fleet in the development of a number of fisheries heretofore considered too
distant to exploit. These fisheries range from salmon in the North Pacific to
tuna in the South Atlantic.3 Perhaps the most extensive and diversified developments have taken place in the fishing fleets of the Soviet Union. Vessels
flying the Soviet flag now ply the waters of every ocean, participating in every
4
type of fishery.
The above statements would lead one to believe that the fisheries of the world
enjoy an unlimited future of further development and expansion. However,
such is not the case. Future fish production is not likely to increase at the same
rate as it has since World War II and a significant decrease is expected compared to the production of the 1960's.1 The number of overfished stocks of fish
is clearly on the increase.' As more technological advances are achieved the
problems which surround the international fisheries, i.e., overfished stocks and
a growing incidence of international disputes, will continue to increase and new
problems will undoubtedly develop.
The consequence of these conditions is that the fishing industries in many
countries already are experiencing grave difficulties. Not only must fishermen
contend with the deleterious effects of the overfishing of traditionally exploited
resources, but they must also absorb the effects of rapid technological obsolescence of fishing gear, high debt burdens and interest charges, rising labor costs,
and the lack of experienced masters for vessels.7
The fishing industry of the United States enjoys no immunity from the
"'Fishing" usually denotes the taking from the sea and other bodies of water their living resources and includes the various related auxiliary operations of transferring and processing the
catches and supplying fishing vessels at sea. A. VOLKOV, MARITIME LAW 9 (1969).
2
Kasahara, The United States Fishing Industry and Related InternationalActivities, in THE
FUTURE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES 242 (De W. Gilbert ed. 1968). South
America produces over 20 percent of the world's supply of fish whereas ten years ago its share
was only 12 percent and in 1958 only 6 percent. Jackson, Article, THE FISHBOAT, March 1971, at
14. See 29 U.N. FAO, YEARBOOK OF FISHERY STATISTICS a-5 to a-16 (1970).
3
Kasahara, supra note 2, at 242.
4
1d.
5

Jackson, supra note 2, at 14.

'Id.
at 57.
7
1d.
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present conditions.' The fishing fleets of ports located in the New England
states are a prime example. The fishermen in this area must contend with the
overfishing of stocks of fish in offshore waters by foreign fleets,9 thus placing
severe pressures upon the marine resource traditionally fished by American
fleets. As a result the number of men and vessels sailing from American ports
has decreased over the last several years"0 while the percentage of fish imported
for domestic consumption has increased significantly."
The problem presented is not only one of domestic concern, but it is also a
problem of momentous international importance. As the world population
increases, the importance of the sea and its resources as a source of food also
increases. In order to best utilize the potential resources available, it is essential
that an efficient and equitable system of international regulation of fisheries
be established. The present system is neither efficient nor equitable, and the
need for corrective measures and reform of the international law of the sea
respecting fisheries is patently evident.
The United States has long been a major maritime nation. As such, it has
placed great importance upon the marine resources, both living and nonliving,
which exist in its coastal waters. The United States could, therefore, reinforce
not only the interests of the community of nations, but also its own vital
national interests by assuming an affirmative and vigorous role in the formulation and institution of these reform measures.
There presently exist three broad alternative courses of action which may be
followed in establishing an international fisheries regime. The first would be
to extend national jurisdiction of coastal states over the area adjacent to their
coasts which is presently considered as part of the high seas. A second alternative is to establish a number of regional commissions with the competence to
administer and regulate the fisheries and fishery resources in their respective
areas. Finally, there is the possibility of establishing an international United
Nations type agency in which is placed the authority to regulate the harvesting
and distribution of the wealth of the sea on a worldwide basis. This Note will
examine each of these possibilities and seek to determine the effectiveness of
'For a general overview of the American fishing industry see THE FUTURE OF THE FISHING
(De W. Gilbert ed. 1968).
'In 1960 the New England fleet landed 93 percent of the total amount of fish caught on the New
England continental shelf. In 1965 the same fleet landed only 35 percent of the total fish caught
while the Soviet Union landed more fish than all of the other nations fishing in that area combined.
Dykstra & Holman, Cost of Fishing and Competition. . . New England, in THE FUTURE OF THE
FISHING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES 105 (De W. Gilbert ed. 1968).
"0The number of vessels of over five tons had increased from 721 to 885 in 1968 while the number
of crewmen decreased from 5,554 to 4,058 during the same period. Id.
"In 1961, 43 percent of the edible fish consumed in the United States was imported. In 1970
the percentage imported was 57 percent after reaching a peak of 60 percent in 1969. In 1970 fishery
imports valued at $962.5 million were brought into the United States, while the United States
exported in the same year only $94.2 million worth of fishery products. The $868.3 million deficit
represented a 17 percent increase over the 1969 deficit. Jackson, supra note 2, at 17.
INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES
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each course of action in solving the problems which plague the international
fisheries.
II.

BACKGROUND

It may be well to begin with an examination of the fundamental principles
and objectives upon which a viable system of international regulation of fisheries must be established. Myers McDougal has stated:
[Tihe very function of the law of the sea is to protect and secure the common
interests of the people of the world. Its entire purpose is to serve the common
interests, both inclusive and exclusive,
of the different communities and to
12
reject all claims of special interest.
This principle is evidenced by the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of
1958.3 Article 2 of the Convention includes the freedom of fishing as one of
the primary constituents of freedom of the high seas. The Convention further
requires that this freedom, as well as all others relating to the use of the high
seas, must be exercised with "reasonable regard to the interests of other
States .. ," The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, 5 promulgated at the same time as the Convention
on the High Seas, also affirms the right of nationals of all States to engage in
fishing on the high seas.16 It places upon nations exercising this freedom the
additional duty of respecting the interests of other states by adhering to obligations accepted by agreements with other states.17
The living resources of the sea are unique in nature. Because a majority of
the species of marine life are highly migratory," they are readily accessible to
those residing on or in close proximity to the coast. This makes it a relatively
simple task for a large number of people to participate in the harvesting of the
resource. For the same reason regulation is made more difficult because
traditional territorial concepts of the exercise of jurisdiction are inapplicable
to the resources of the sea. 0
The fundamental policy problem involved in establishing a system of fisher"2McDougal, InternationalLaw and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA I (L. Alexander
ed. 1967).
"Done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter
referred to as the High Seas Convention].
"Id., art. 2.
"Done April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter
referred to as the Fishing Convention].
"Id., art. I.
7

1 1d.

"See Chapman, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 95-97 (L.
Alexander ed. 1967).
"The size of the effort expended in harvesting the resources of the sea is reflected in the fact
that over 500,000 motorized vessels are engaged in fishing around the world. Jackson, supra note
2, at 60.
2"See note 71 infra.
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ies regulation on an international basis is threefold .2 First, any system which
is established must promote the utilization of ocean fisheries as a source of food
for the world population. Second, the system must provide for the continued
22
and sustained production from the resources for a substantial period of time.
Third, the system must also encourage a rational allocation of effort to promote fishery exploration in search of avenues of expansion consistent with an
overall plan. In meeting these considerations, several further matters must be
taken into account such as the nature of limitations placed upon the use of the
resource, the regulation of access to the resource, the composition and authority of the policymaking and administrative bodies involved in the system, and
23
the method of the resolution of disputes.
In order to be effective, a system of regulation and conservation 4 must be
founded upon sound scientific information concerning the areas and stocks of
fish to be subject to regulation. Information on the population, movement, and
ecological relationships of the stocks under consideration is a prerequisite to
meaningful regulation and conservation. 5 The difficulty of such a task is compounded by its size and complexity as well as the lack (in many cases) of
sufficient qualified personnel or sufficient capital to invest in the undertaking.,
Such a situation readily lends itself to international cooperation.
Any research of this nature, whether undertaken by a single nation 27 or
2

Burke, Contemporary Legal Problems in Ocean Development. in TOWARDS A BETTER USE
64 (1969).
"Every fish population has a natural resiliency. As the production of the fishery increases, there
is a decrease in the total number of the fish in the population, and the total weight and average
size of the fish decrease. This process continues until a certain point (maximum sustainable yield)
beyond which the yield of the fishery also begins to decrease no matter how much effort is put
into the fishery. The objective, therefore, is to maintain the production of the fishery at this point
of maximum sustainable yield without overfishing the stock. Chapman, supra note 18, at 94. The
concept of overfishing based upon the notion of a fish population in equilibrium with its environment has been reduced to a formula by McDougal and Burke:
C = Size of Catch in One Year
A = Gain from Reproduction
G = Growth in Stock
M = Natural Mortality
If(C<A) + G - M = Stock Increased
If(C>A) + G - M = Stock Decreased
If (C = A) + G - M = No Change - "equilibrium catch"
M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 470 (1962).
'Schaefer, Some Recent Developments Concerning Fishing and the Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 374 (1970).
2
Article 2 of the Fishing Convention, supra note 15, defines conservation as "the aggregate of
those measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to
secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products."
I'M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 22, at 459-62.
"Id. at 464, 465.
21The primary agency in charge of fishery development in the United States is the National
Marine Fisheries Service, a branch of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of
the U.S. Department of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. §§ 760e - 760g (1970).
OF THE OCEAN
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through international cooperation involves questions of science, law, and economics to determine what the resources are and where they are located, to
whom they belong, and the extent of their value." Results of such studies can
show that careful regulation of fisheries resources may permit an increasing
yield without endangering the specific species. Preliminary studies into fisheries problems emphasize the necessity of sustained research to insure that particular controls continue to be the best method adapted to a fishery and that all
29
participants in the fishery are subject to these controls.
An effective international fisheries regime must also operate with a high
degree of economic efficiency. This economic efficiency is in turn based upon
a principle of flexibility in relation to changes in the pattern of demand and to
the amount and kind of effort to be applied by the participants. Flexibility in
changing the pattern of demand is necessary to counteract such effects on
currently under utilized species ° as well as the effects on the production of
traditionally fished stocks. Flexibility in the areas of capital use and labor is
necessitated by technological changes. Those developments which reduce the
cost per unit of effort may make it economically feasible to increase the amount
of effort. At the same time those changes which reduce the cost per unit of
catch will call for reductions in the amount of effort,"
The nature of the participation of states in any form of international fishery
regulation must also be taken into consideration. Such participation is in most
cases completely self-serving, being determined by the interest which a state
possesses in a particular region or stock as a function of the fishing activity of
its nationals.3 2 The range of these interests is wide and varied. One end of the
scale is occupied by nations such as Iceland, which is wholly dependent upon
the yield from its fisheries and desires to exclude all foreign interests from the
area of its continental shelf. 33 At the other end of the scale are those nations,
such as Japan, who consider themselves critically dependent on the yield of
2

'Fye, Maxwell, Emery, & Ketchum, Ocean Science and Marine Resources, in USES OF THE

SEAS 31 (E. Gullion ed. 1968).
"Bishop, The InternationalLaw Commission Draft Articles on Fisheries, 50 A.J.I.L. 627 (1956).
0Christy, The Distribution of the Sea's Wealth in Fisheries, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 115 (L.
Alexander ed. 1967).
'd. at 116.
12Burke, supra note 21, at 77.
[I]t is too premature to generalize any principle supporting the artificial allocation of
fish resources for the benefit of some historically or geographically privileged States, or
to discard the principle of free competition . . . . Few will doubt that, until the time
comes, when, as in municipal society, some super-authority can guarantee equitable
sharing of different resources among the nations, the states will continue to argue for
adoption of principles most favorable to their own interests in the field of high seas
fishing.
Oda, Japan and International Conventions Relating to North Pacific Industries, 43 WASH. L. REV.
63, 73 (1967).
33
Chapman, Concerning Fishing Jurisdiction and the Regime of the Deep Sea Bed, in
TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEANS 162 (1969).
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their fisheries, both nutritionally and economically, and want their vessels to
be able to fish anywhere on the high areas.34
An important, if not central, source of conflict over ocean fisheries and a
major stumbling block in the path of the establishment of an effective international fisheries regime is the traditional law of the sea which places most fishery
stocks beyond the jurisdiction of any single authority. 5 This principle resulted
from a conflict between the concepts of res nullius and res communis omnium.
Under the concept of res nullius the high seas were viewed as belonging to no
one. As such they were subject to permanent appropriation and occupation. If
such an area was appropriated it was no longer subject to the principles of
freedom of the high seas and as appropriation increased the freedom of the seas
became more restricted. 3 On the other hand, under the principle of res cornmunis omnium the high seas are looked upon as being the property of the
community of nations as a whole and thereby subject to appropriation by no
one. It is this latter concept which is now the accepted view under the interna37
tional law of the sea.
It must be remembered that the problem presented by the regulation of
international fisheries is not one which will be resolved solely by the application
of legal principles. The talents of governmental leaders and international statesmen will have to come into full play. National interests traditionally have
asserted the responsibility for managing fishery resources to ensure that the
maximum yield will be produced and that its fishing fleets have ready access
to such resources.3 s On the international level, however, there must exist a
responsibility to work toward the establishment of new systems of regulation
and conservation which are efficient, equitable and acceptable to other nations
involved. Unless an acceptable resolution of these interests is achieved, the
entire system breaks down, allowing some nations to gain an unfair economic
advantage. 39 Should this occur one of the probable alternative actions considered by the disadvantaged nation or nations would be the use of economic or
military force. 0
34

ld.
'Chapman, supra note 18, at 93.
36
Manner, Comment, in TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN 185 (1969).
3
1The principle of res communis omnium was recognized early in the United States. In The
Adventure, I Fed. Cas. 202 (No. 93) (C.C.D. Va. 1812), rev'd on other grounds, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
221 (1814), Marshall, C.J., writing for the circuit court, held that the bringing of a ship acquired
on the high seas as a gift into the United States did not constitute importation of foreign goods
from a foreign place under the Embargo Act of March 1, 1809, 2 Stat. 528, since "the sea is the
common property of all nations," and is not a foreign place subject to appropriation by any one
nation. Id. at 204-05.
31McKernan, International Fishery Policy and the United States Fishing Industry, in THE
FUTURE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES 254 (De W. Gilbert ed. 1968).
"Chapman, United States Policy on High Seas Fisheries, 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 67, 69 (1949).
'5 Schaefer, supra note 23, at 403. For examples of the use of military force see Oliver, Wet War
-North Pacific, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 621 (1971). An example of economic force was H.R. 10607,
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EXTENSION OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

Three basic methods have been suggested by which a nation may extend its
claims to exclusive use and control over fishing areas adjacent to its coast: 4'
changes in the means used in determining the area of the states' internal waters;
extension of the states' territorial seas; and the creation of special contiguous
zones within which the same rights apply as are exercised by the states within
their territorial seas. 2
A.

Changes in the Method of Determining Internal Waters

The internal waters of a state are those waters which are situated on the
landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea.4 3 The interests of the state
in controlling the activities in these waters are quite similar to its interests in
its territory on land. The state enjoys the right of exclusive control of these
waters subject only to the customary limitations imposed by international law."
By definition the position of the baseline of the territorial sea is the controlling factor in determining the extent of the internal waters of the state. Therefore, any change in the manner in which these baselines are drawn directly
affects the area of the internal waters. The normal position of the baseline is
the low water line along the coast.45 This method of positioning baselines results
in internal waters of limited extent since the baseline follows the contour of the
coastline. If, however, a straightline method is used in placing the baseline, a
different result follows. The straightline method is usually employed in areas
with severely erratic and indented coastlines and in bays and inlets of certain
sizes.46 Under this method the baseline is drawn from one salient point to the
next rather than by following the contour of the coastline. As a result large
areas are taken into the state's internal waters and become subject to its exclusive jurisdiction.
B.

Extension of the Territorial Sea

The placement of baselines is also of importance in relation to the extent of
a state's territorial sea. The extent of a nation's assertion of jurisdiction over
91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), introduced by Rep. Thomas M. Pelly of Washington. This bill would
have placed prohibitions upon the importing of fish or fishing products from any nation that seized
a tuna boat from the United States.
"Landlocked nations may also be involved in claims to offshore areas. Such nations have
legitimate interests in the use of the seas and are often represented at international conferences on
the law of the sea. Alexander, Offshore Claims of the World, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 72 (L.
Alexander ed. 1967).
4
Burke, supra note 21, at 62.
"Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 5, done April 29, 1958, [1963]
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter referred to as the Convention on
the Territorial Sea].
"McDougal, supra note 12, at 17.
"Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 3, supra note 43.
"Id., art. 4.
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its territorial sea depends upon the breadth claimed and the position of the
baselines.4 7 The interests exercised by the state in its territorial sea are similar
to those exercised in the internal waters. In the waters of the territorial sea,
however, the interests of other nations become more definite in the form of
rights such as the right of innocent passage.4"
Present claims by nations to territorial sea extend from a minimum of three
miles to a maximum of 200 miles. 9 The number of nations claiming a three
mile territorial limit has declined, but a number of major fishing nations such
as the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States continue to adhere to
the three mile limit.50 It now seems to be an accepted principle of customary
international law that claims of territorial jurisdiction in excess of three miles
are not unlawful and the three mile limit is no longer accepted as a binding
restriction.5" It seems to be the consensus, however, that claims reaching out
2
to 200 miles are a definite infringement upon the freedom of the seas.
An example of a claim between these two extremes can be found in action
taken by the Government of Iceland. In June 1958, the Government of Iceland
announced its intention to extend Iceland's fisheries limit to a distance of 12
miles. This limit was continued until July 1971, when Iceland issued a policy
statement claiming an extension of this 12 mile limit to 50 nautical miles from
the baselines, effective not later than September 1, 1972. This policy of claiming a 50 mile limit would greatly affect the fishing rights of Great Britain, the
Federal Republic of Germany and other nations whose fishing fleets do a
substantial amount of fishing within 50 miles of Iceland's coastline. Great
Britain5 3 and the Federal Republic of Germany 4 instituted proceedings before
the International Court of Justice in June 1972 challenging the new 50 mile
limit claimed by Iceland. The Court noted probable jurisdiction55 and granted
both Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany's requests for interim
protection measures in August 1972.51 Under the interim measures, the Court
ordered all parties not to change the pre-September 1972 situation and to
refrain from doing anything which would influence the course of the proceed"Alexander, supra note 41, at 76.
"8Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 14, supra note 43.

"U.N.

FAO,

LIMITS AND STATUS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, EXCLUSIVE

FISHING ZONES, FISH-

(1969). For the history and background
of the development of the three mile limit see Heinzen, The Three Mile Limit: Preserving the
Freedom of the Seas, II STAN. L. REV. 597 (1959).
"Alexander, supra note 41, at 78.
"Burke, supra note 21, at 74.
ERY CONSERVATION ZONES AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

52

1d.

53

United Kingdom of Great Britain and N. Ireland v. Iceland, [1972] 1.C.J. __
(application instituting proceedings, April 14, 1972).
"4Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland, [1972] I.C.J. (application instituting
proceedings, June 5, 1972).
-[1972]
- I.C.J. _.
51 I INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1069 (1972).
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ings until the Court has had time to consider the two cases on their merits."
The traditional position of the United States has been to view the three mile
limit as the maximum breadth of the territorial sea cognizable under international law with any greater extent held to be a violation of the freedom of the
seas." The United States is amenable, however, to the establishment of special
fishery zones. The United States has taken such action itself,59 but maintains
that other attempts to extend jurisdictional claims over fisheries by other means
in excess of twelve miles can only have the inimical effect of hampering the
full utilization of fishery resources and may, also, lead to retaliatory actions
by distant water fishing states with harmful results.8 0
C.

Contiguous Zones

A state may also extend its claims to exclusive use and control over fishing
areas adjacent to its coast by the creation of special contiguous zones. Should
a state regard itself as uniquely affected or threatened by specific activities on
the high seas adjacent to its territorial waters, it may exercise its jurisdiction
therein by the making and applying of laws aimed at the control of such
activities, even if they are the activities of nationals and vessels of other states.6'
This principle was asserted in the Norwegian Fisheries Case. 62 Such claims
must be justified, however, in the light of the geographical extent of the claim,
the nature of the controls and limitations imposed by the claim, and the acceptability of the claim to other states.
The United States exercises its jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters for
customs purposes through the use of special contiguous zones., 3 In 1966, the
United States Congress created a fishery zone contiguous to the territorial sea
and extending nine miles therefrom resulting in an area twelve miles wide in
which the United States claims exclusive fisheries jurisdiction." One of the
bases of this claim was that, at the time of the passage of the act, more than
57

/d.

"Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923):
It is now settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject
to its jurisdiction includes the land area under its dominion and control, the ports,
harbors, bays, and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of
sea extending from the coastline outward a marine league, or three geographic miles.
The United States did submit a compromise proposal for a six mile sea at the Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea (1958). It failed to receive the 2/3 vote required for passage. 4 M.
WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-102 (1965). See generally Dean, The Law of the Sea, 38
DEP'T STATE BULL. 574 (1958).
59
See Act to Establish Contiguous Fishery Zones Beyond the Territorial Sea of the United
States, 16 U.S.C. § 1091 et seq. (1970).
SSchaefer, supra note 23, at 392.
"See McDougal, supra note 12, at 18.
.2[1951] I.C.J. 116.
uSee Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq. (1970); Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19
U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1970).
"See note 59 supra.
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half of the world's coastal states asserted exclusive jurisdiction over zones
twelve miles in width or more, either by claiming a twelve mile territorial sea
or by the use of contiguous zones. It was further asserted that such a claim
would help prevent the depletion or extinction of valuable species of fish and
other marine life. Thus the United States would be in a better position to
conserve and nurture certain massive fish resources in order to meet the future
demands for fisheries and fish products and to help cope with the world's
expanding hunger problem. In creating a contiguous fishery zone, Congress
further maintained that the United States also had an interest in forestalling
illicit reconnaissance activities along the coast of the United States by foreign
fishing vessels. 5
Whether a state expands its exclusive jurisdiction by the extension of its
internal waters, its territorial sea, or by the creation of contiguous zones, it may
still choose to recognize the historic right of a state to fish in the waters over
which jurisdiction is asserted. The extent of these acquired historical rights is
measured by the duration, frequency, and nature of the fishing activity of the
state in the particular area under consideration. 6 Although a system which
recognizes historic rights should encourage the development of new fisheries,
it could result in a wasteful and uneconomic race to stake out claims in areas
and fisheries in a manner not suited to the overall best interests of the regime.
Such a system would also result in the exclusion of nations from a number of
fisheries. Nations such as Japan and the Soviet Union with wide-ranging distant water fleets would benefit greatly from such a plan while the United States
would realize a gain in a limited number of areas, 7 such as the shrimp industry
in the Gulf of Mexico or the tuna industry in the Pacific.
The late Dr. Wilbert M. Chapman was of the opinion, however, that even if
a 200 mile fishery zone was established as an international norm, the chief
beneficiary in the long run would be the United States and the chief losers
would be the developing nations, the primary proponents of the 200 mile zone. 68
Dr. Chapman based his conclusion on the fact that the fishing fleets of the
United States have access to the largest market in the world. They also have
access to some of the most abundant underfished resources in the world. A 200
"Christol, Social Complex of World Fisheries:Law in Support of World Needs, in THE FUTURE
306 (De W. Gilbert ed. 1968).
"Comment, At Sea with the 89th Congress: The United States FisheriesZone, 18 HASTINGS L.
J. 937, 955 (1967). Acquired historical rights may arise from: (a) the enjoyment of a fishery by
nationals of an overseas state at a time when the adjacent mainland was terra nullius; (b) a nonexclusive servitude acquired by prescription adverse to the coastal state, i.e., a right to share in
the fishery; (c) nonexclusive rights created by private fishermen who were not in any way asserting
public international law claims. L. Goldie, The Ocean's Resources and International
Law-Possible Developments in Regional FisheriesManagement, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
25-28 (1969).
"Chapman, Christy, Baxter, Allen, and Pontecorvo, A Symposium on InternationalInterests
in Coastal Waters, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 128 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
"Chapman, Article, THE FISHBOAT, March 1971, at 47.
OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES
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mile zone would give the United States fleets an extra advantage as regards
these resources. The United States also has more foreign vessels fishing off its
coasts within 200 miles than any other country. 9 A 200 mile limit combined
with these factors would definitely enhance the growth of the American fishing
industry.
On the other hand, Dr. Chapman continued, many of the developing nations
have quite narrow avenues of access to the ocean and its resources. Further
development of their industries would, therefore, be hampered by this limited
access made even more limited by the imposition of the 200 mile zone.70
Any beneficial effects which might be derived from a system of fisheries
regulation based upon expanded claims of national jurisdiction are overshadowed by the inherent detrimental consequences of such a system. Exclusive
fisheries zones have been shown to have disadvantageous effects on efficient
production and unprofitable effects on economic yield.7 In fact, it is quite
possible that a worldwide system of exclusive fishery zones would probably
result in decreased total production by the world fisheries due to the fact that
many coastal states would find the management of extended areas off their
coasts a task beyond their ability to accomplish economically and efficiently.
The increased costs and hindered production accruing from such a system
72
would therefore offset any gains which might be realized.
Attempts to impose measures designed to promote the conservation of marine life within the area of exclusive jurisdiction would also prove ineffective.
As pointed out above, the highly migratory nature of most species would, in
many instances, place them beyond the authority of any single nation for
significant periods of time, thereby subjecting the stocks to exploitation by
vessels of other nations outside the exclusive fishery zone. Such a situation
would require further international agreement if it were to be resolved.73 A
satisfactory allocation of resources would not result from such a regime. Those
states claiming extended areas of exclusive jurisdiction would most likely severely limit, if not bar completely, access to the resources of the area by foreign
fleets. The effect of such action would be the hindrance of production and
development of international fisheries.
Claims of expanded jurisdiction would create conflict between the interests
of inshore and distant water fleets and between national security interests and
fisheries interests in the state involved.74 For example, in the United States the
fishing industries located in the waters off the Pacific Northwest, Alaska,
Northeast Atlantic, and Central Atlantic coasts favor a wider zone of exclusive
691d.
7

0ld.
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Comment, FisheriesJurisdiction Beyond the TerritorialSea- With Special Reference to the
Policy of the United States, 44 WASH. L. REv. 307, 328 (1968).
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Burke, supra note 21, at 65-66.
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jurisdiction due to the large foreign fleets operating in these areas. The American tuna fleets which work the waters off the Pacific coast of South America
and the shrimp fleets which operate in the South Atlantic and the Gulf of
Mexico are opposed to wider zones of exclusive jurisdiction.75 These latter
interests depend upon being allowed to fish in close proximity to foreign coasts
and territorial waters for their continued existence.
The national security interests of many states require that its vessels be able
to pass freely through as large an area of the high seas as is practicable. For
this reason the military establishments in most states support narrow territorial
seas and limited jurisdiction so that the freedom of navigation on the high seas
may be maintained to the fullest extent possible." On the other hand, the
fishing industries demand that exclusive jurisdiction be expanded to its fullest
extent in order to conserve and maintain the resources of the sea and to prevent
encroachment by foreign fleets. These conflicts contribute to the circumstances
which have made and continue to make it impossible to arrive at any international agreement as to a definite width for territorial seas and as to the proper
extent of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction. An international determination on the
extent of territorial seas is essential to the establishment of any rational international fisheries regime no matter what its basis.
An international regime premised upon national jurisdictional claims would
also severely infringe upon the freedom of the high seas. It is readily apparent
that as claims of national jurisdiction over areas once considered as the high
seas are encouraged and increased, the area in which navigation, fishing, and
other activities may be carried on free of the jurisdiction of a single state is
proportionately decreased.77
The above discussion seems to indicate that a jurisdictional approach is no
longer adequate as a basis for the solution of the present world fisheries problems. This statement finds support in the developments which have taken place
from the late nineteenth century to the present day and which have caused
concern about the effectiveness of a decentralized, essentially laissez-faire, legal
order in the settlement of fisheries disputes." As technological developments
increased, the desire of nations to participate in more distant fisheries increased. As sail gave way to steam and steam to the diesel engine, it became
more profitable to engage in distant water fisheries and as the number of
nations participating in such fisheries increased so did the possibility of international conflict and dispute. As techniques of catching, preserving, and transporting fish have become more effective, a situation has developed in which the
maintenance and in some cases the survival of certain species has become
endangered.
7

"Id. at 392.
7
Id. at 389.
"See note 36 supra, and accompanying text.
7
Falk, Settling Ocean Fishing Conflicts: The Limits of "'Law Reforms" in a Horizontal Legal
Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 327-28 (De W. Gilbert
ed. 1968).
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Another major inadequacy of a jurisdictional approach to the regulation of
international fisheries and the settlement of disputes is presented by the events
which followed the promulgation by President Truman in 1945 of proclamations dealing with the continental shelf" and coastal fisheries.80 A large number
of nations used these proclamations to justify expanded claims to exclusive
control at the expense of the freedom of the seas.8" Although the proclamation
on the continental shelf did extend the jurisdiction of the United States over
the seabed of the continental shelf and its resources, it is arguable that neither
of the proclamations was sufficient to justify such action as that taken by Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru in the Declaration of Santiago" in establishing a 200 mile
exclusive fishery zone. 3
The Fisheries Proclamation did not afford American fishermen any preference over other fishermen in relation to the resources in the area covered by
it. The proclamation merely asserted the right of the United States to unilaterally establish conservation zones in areas where only its nationals were engaged
in fishing activities and to establish such zones jointly by agreement in areas
contiguous to American waters when other nations were fishing therein. 4 The
proclamation further set forth that the intent and policy of the United States
was to conserve the resources in areas contiguous to the United States but not
to establish any new principles of jurisdiction over fisheries beyond the limits
of the territorial sea.85
These developments over the past one hundred years have not prevented,
however, the emergence of an awareness of the importance of fishing as an
economic foundation for developing states and as a source of food for the
world's population. The extent of this awareness is indicated primarily by the
"Proc. No. 2667, "Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf," Sept. 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884. See also 4 M.
WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 740 - 931 (1965).

1OProc. No. 2668, "Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain
Areas of the High Seas," Sept. 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 885 [hereinafter referred to as the Fisheries
Proclamation]. See also 4 M.

WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL

LAW 945-62 (1965).

"Continental shelf claims limited to the sea bed and subsoil were soon made by Australia,
Bahrein, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Trucial Sheikdoms, Venezuela and the United Kingdom (for Bahamas,
British Honduras, Falkland Islands, and Jamaica but not for the homeland). Continental shelf
claims including claims to sovereignty over waters above the continental shelf, or fisheries therein,
have been made by Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Peru. Chile, Ecuador, Panama,
Peru, and Salvador claim 200 miles off their coasts for fisheries purposes. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW

8

640 (2d ed. 1962).
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acknowledgement by many nations that the freedom to fish on the high seas
may need in some instances to be subordinated to the objectives of sound
conservation programs and harmonized by regulation with community goals
to increase the food supply of the world. 6
IV.

REGIONAL COMMISSIONS

It is apparent that international fisheries commissions have played an important role in fisheries regulation and will most likely continue to do so.8 7 The
importance of these commissions is based on their achieving the implementation of conservation methods, which are grounded upon reliable scientific information and which have as their objective the maintenance of the maximum
yield of the fishery or fisheries on a continuing basis. 8s The more extensive use
of regional commissions would allow for a close examination of problems and
conditions and would afford a better range of solutions to these problems.
Diverse methods in the use of fisheries which result in waste and inefficient
production would be minimized by focusing on limited areas or specific
stocks.89 The disparities which have traditionally hindered agreement, such as
differences in economic or governmental systems, degrees of dependence upon
marine fisheries as a source of income, and types of fish sought and methods
of catching them, would be more easily considered and resolved on a regional
basis. The ultimate goal would be to bring into existence a system under which
conservation by regulation and economic management would complement each
other .1
To be effective such a commission must exercise a considerable amount of
autonomy to make decisions and enforce such decisions. Definite and clear
agreement among the members as to the objectives of the organization is
another requisite for effectiveness. In order for the management actions undertaken by the commission to be meaningful and effective, it must have access
to the apparatus for the collection of competent scientific data upon which to
base such actions. The internal organization and administration of the commission must be designed in a manner which allows for flexibility, but a flexibility
which affords the necessary controls consonant with the objectives of the commission. Finally, provision must be made for a procedure for arbitration among
the members of the commission, among members and non-members, and
among the individual regional commissions themselves.
8
Falk,
87

supra note 78, at 327.
The United States is presently a member of nine international fisheries commissions: Great
Lakes Fishery Commission (1955); Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (1949); North
Pacific Fur Seal Commission (191 I); International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (1952);
International Pacific Halibut Commission (1924); International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (1949); International Whaling Commission (1948); International Atlantic Tuna Commission (1966). See Fye, et al.,
supra note 28, at 67.
8id.
"Comment, supra note 71, at 330.
"Burke, supra note 21, at 72.
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Authority for the formation of such commissions may be found in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas." Article 4 states:
[i]f the nationals of two or more nations are engaged in fishing the same stock
or stocks of fish or other living marine resources in any area or areas of the
high seas, these states shall, at the request of any of them, enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement for their nationals the necessary
measures for the conservation of the living resources affected.
The Convention provides for the protection of the interests of all states affected
by setting forth criteria under which the acceptability and propriety of the
contemplated measures would be determined by a compulsory method.92
One possible approach, utilizing the international commission concept,
would be the establishment of a worldwide system of independent and autonomous regional commissions. Each commission would be given the responsibility of conservation regulation and economic management over a specific region
and the stocks of fish within that region. Care must be taken to provide for
cooperation both among the separate regional commissions and among the
commissions and public international organizations which have related objectives such as the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. In this way,
work will be
effective collaboration and coordination with respect to 9 their
3
ensured and needless duplication of effort will be avoided.
The commission will have to be given authority to impose and enforce necessary regulations which have been derived from the findings of scientific study.
Each commission should have the authority to formulate and apply measures
dealing with such matters as the establishment of open and closed seasons, the
closing to fishing of such areas as are found to be spawning areas or areas
populated by small or immature fish, the establishment of size limits for any
species, the proscription of certain types of fishing gear, and the establishment
of an overall catch limit for any species. 4 Authority must also be given the
commission to take action against nonmembers who may adversely affect the
interests of the member states or the overall objectives of the commission.95 The
effect of such provisions would be to allocate to the commissions authority of
a more substantive nature than exists under most of the present agreements
establishing international fisheries commissions."
9
Fishing
2

Convention, supra note 15.
Fishing Convention, art. 9 - 12, supra note 15.
"Cf International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, art. X, done Feb. 8, 1949,
[1950] I U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157, [hereinafter referred to as N.W.
Atlantic Convention]. See also, 4 M. WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 982 (1965).
4
Cf N.W. Atlantic Convention, art. VIII, supra note 93.
"Cf International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, art. VI,
done May 9, 1952, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65, [hereinafter referred
to as N. Pacific Convention]. See also 4 M. WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 997 (1965).
"E.g., N. Pacific Convention, supra note 95.
1
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Agreement as to the objectives the commission expects to achieve is essential. If the objectives are stated clearly each member is aware of its duties and
responsibilities and also of its rights and privileges.
As has been pointed out above, any regime of international fisheries regulation must be based upon sound scientific information.97 The regional commission, therefore, must be responsible for obtaining and disseminating necessary
information concerning the area under its control and the stocks of fish therein.
Each commission should have the authority to undertake, either in collaboration with other bodies or independently, the investigation of factors such as the
abundance, life history and ecology of the aquatic life within its region, the
current conditions and trends of the fishery resources of the area, and methods
of increasing stocks of fish.98 It may prove useful to allow the commission to
conduct exploratory fishing operations."
The efficacy of each commission will depend upon the effectiveness of its
organization and administration. Membership in each commission could be
voluntary but with the condition that only those states who are members of the
commission may exploit the resources in the commission area.100 Provision
should be made to allow a state to be a member of more than one commission.
In this way a state could become a member in as many fisheries as its own
ability and initiative would allow, but the state would still have to operate
within controlled systems instead of in the present wasteful system of almost
unlimited competition. The criteria of membership could be arranged so that
historic fishing rights' 0' would be recognized and an annual contribution would
be collected. Those nations unable to assert such claims would be required to
pay an additional tax or license fee for the privilege of fishing in the commission
area as a member. Such a system would create a definite right to fish and would
raise revenues for the operation of the commission. To alleviate any hardships
resulting from the imposition of such a system, provision should be made for
a transitional period of adjustment during which nations may withdraw from
the fisheries of areas in which they do not wish to be commission members. 02
If a system of this nature is to be workable, it must provide an effective
method of arbitration. Arbitration and the settlement of disputes arising between or among members of the same commission should be compulsory in
order that the objectives of conservation regulation and economic management
may be best achieved. The settlement of disputes could be handled either
directly among the parties themselves in accordance with Article 33 of the
United Nations Charter,0 3 by a special arbitration panel of the commission, 04
or by submission of the question to the International Court of Justice.
"7See M.

McDOUGAL & W. Burke, supra note 22, at 459.
"0See N.W. Atlantic Convention, art. VI, supra note 93.
"gId.
' Cf European Fisheries Convention, art. 3, done March 9, 1964, 581 U.N.T.S. 58.
"'See note 66 supra.
'"See European Fisheries Convention, art. 9 supra note 100.

'U.N.

CHARTER

art. 33, para. I:
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V.

INTERNATIONAL AGENCY

As the world population increases and growing demands are placed upon the
food supplies of the world, the resources of the sea should be among the first
of the world's food sources to be the subject of extensive worldwide regulation.
Support for international control of the right to fish on the high seas already
exists among individuals and groups interested in the establishment of a world
government and in the activities of the United Nations toward the establishment of an international regime for the peaceful use of the seabed.0 5 International control of fisheries is apparently favored by most of the developing
nations which have little capital to invest in the development of fisheries technology and little technical knowledge or ability with which to begin such a
task.10
One plan which has been proposed would have the United Nations assert a
claim in the name of mankind for the permanent and exclusive right to the
marine resources of the high seas lying seaward from the territorial waters of
coastal states.107 Under this plan each nation would be entitled to claim territorial waters only to a width chosen for uniform application by the community
of nations as a whole.
Control of the world's fisheries would be delegated by the United Nations
to a commission with worldwide authority. Its duties would be similar to those
of regional commissions but on a much wider scale in that the international
fisheries commission would identify fishing areas, establish quotas, select fishing seasons, prescribe methods of capture, determine the resources to be harvested, and carry on conservation and scientific research on a worldwide basis
rather than in a limited region. The commission would also have the duty of
managing the distribution of the economic proceeds of world fish production.
One share would go to the United Nations with the remainder being divided
among the nations participating in the fishery and those nonparticipants entitled to a share.10 s
The international agency would also have the responsibility of controlling the
entry of participants into the fisheries. In this way the agency could control the
outlay of capital and labor in the various fisheries. A method of direct limitation on the amount of effort expended would be through the issuance of licenThe parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
10'See European Fisheries Convention, Annex II supra note 100.
'0'Schaefer, supra note 23 at 386; see Peaceful Use of Sea Bed Comm., Report, 26 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971) and 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8721
(1972). See generally S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCEAN DEVELOPMENT, 73-227, 515519 (1972).
'"'Schaefer, supra note 23, at 388.
0
' Christol, supra note 65, at 307.
08
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ses. By this procedure licenses would be issued only to that number of producers which would yield the largest net revenue and at the same time maintain
the maximum sustainable yield.' 09 The economic benefits of such a controlled
system would accrue directly to the license holders while the consumers of
fisheries products would benefit from the sustained high yield.
Difficulties might arise here due to the varying wage and price structures of
the nations of the world. These differences would lead to different conclusions
by the parties as to the proper amount of effort or potential net revenue. 110 A
more difficult issue is raised by the fact that if licenses are limited to those
nations with historic rights to fish in the area then other nations would be
required to buy a license from a nation retiring from the fishery or be excluded
altogether. This would result in a nation having to pay for what is now a free
right."' A compromise could probably be reached by affording a preference in
the issuance of licenses to those nations with historic rights rather than complete exclusion of prior nonparticipants.
Choosing an acceptable unit of effort to be licensed also might present
difficulties. If licenses were issued to each vessel or to a fixed number of vessels
per license the result would be a race to build larger and faster vessels. Such a
situation would defeat the purpose of the plan."'
Since the license fee would add to the costs of the industry it would probably
discourage excess producers and this benefit would accrue directly to the
participants. These excess profits, or economic rent, could be appropriated by
the international agency in the form of an additional tax on the yield of the
fishery. In this manner society will benefit by having achieved a more rational
allocation and application of capital and labor and by the acquisition of3 funds
that were formerly dissipated in the wasteful race of free competiton.1
The concept of world ownership, upon which this regime is based, involves
two basic concepts: the right of exclusion and the right to a share in the
production of the resource."' The right or exclusion provides the justification
for the regulation of entry into the exploitation of a resource. The right to a
share in the production of the resource itself is a more extensive and beneficial
right than the tenuous right of exploitation afforded by the present system. Out
of these concepts a formula for equitable distribution of the wealth must be
evolved. Such a formula could be based upon any number of criteria including
the need of the particular nation, its population, or the length of its coastline
5

if a coastal state.1

The legal basis for this international system may be found primarily in the
"Christy, supra note 30, at 116.
"Old.

"'Id.
112d.
"Id. at 117-18.
'Id. at II].
"'Baxter, supra note 67, at 129.
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United Nations Charter.' Chapter IX of the Charter imposes upon the organization a general responsibility to improve the economic and social status of
men and nations. Although these provisions do not expressly authorize the
formation of an international agency charged with the regulation of the fisheries of the world neither do they expressly prohibit such an undertaking. If the
United Nations has the power to take action to prevent the pestilence of war
it is arguable that it should also have the analogous power to prevent the
pestilence of famine.
It is also argued that the United Nations possesses sufficient legal standing
to assert the necessary claims to jurisdiction and control over the high seas." 7
The United Nations as an institution possesses certain corporate powers different from those of the nations which make up its membership and also has status
in international law as a claimant as well as a defendant for harms done in its
legal capacity."' A further analogy may be drawn between these proposed
claims at sea and the claims already made by the United Nations in outer
space. " 9 If the organization can do one, it should be able to do the other.
A distinction should also be made between the right of navigation and the
right of fishing. Navigation can be free because it does not involve the consumption or depletion of a resource as does fishing. This suggests that it would
be possible to separate the two issues making agreement easier to achieve and
allowing the international agency to make claims of exclusive fishery jurisdiction even though it could not make the same claims regarding freedom of
navigation. 20
Although it is possible that such an international fisheries regime would be
self-enforcing, since an extremely high level of cooperation was necessary to
bring it into existence to begin with, authority for the exercise of formal enforcement powers may be found in the United Nations Charter., Chapter VII
allows the Security Council to take necessary actions when a threat to world
peace exists. As before mentioned, fisheries disputes are capable of presenting
such threats to world peace.' Article 41123 provides sanctions, short of the use
of force, which could be applied to recalcitrant states along with the threat of
"'Christol, supra note 65, at 308.
1171d.
"'See Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Services of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174
(advisory opinion); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151 (advisory opinion).
"'See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [19671 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
120Christol, supra note 65, at 308.
21
1

id.

'1Supranote 40.
123The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations
to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. U.N. CHARTER art. 41, para. I.
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suspension or expulsion from the United Nations." 4 If necessary, the United
Nations could also intervene with armed forces.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As we approach the conclusion of the twentieth century, it becomes increasingly obvious that man must change his attitudes about the utilization and
distribution of the world's resources or suffer dire consequences. This observation is particularly poignant when the limited resources and delicate ecological
balance of the sea are considered. Unless a concerted effort is made to manage
and conserve the resources of the sea in a rational manner, an important source
of protein for the world's population may be grossly wasted or irretrievably
lost.
The pros and cons of the possible regimes for the international regulation of
fisheries have been discussed above. Certainly it can be said that a regime based
on the expansion of claims of exclusive jurisdiction does little to resolve the
problem and may create additional ones. The establishment of an agency with
worldwide authority to regulate fishing may be a consummation devoutly to
be desired but it is a concept which is far from implementation. It is hoped that
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 5 scheduled for
November-December 1973 in New York and for April-May 1974 in Santiago,
Chile will make significant strides forward in solving the many problems which
confront the nations of the world in seeking to conserve and efficiently distribute the fish resources of the oceans of the world.
The institution of a system of regional fisheries commissions seems to afford
the best alternative of the three proposals discussed herein. Past performance
indicates that such commissions have been quite effective in attaining their
goals.2 6 This type of solution to the problem would also involve less drastic
changes in the scheme of world order on the high seas.
A problem would arise with this solution as with any other in that it will
probably be difficult for its proponents to muster sufficient support for its
approval either in the United Nations General Assembly or at the Law of the
Sea Conference. A major stumbling block would be the tendency of the developing nations and certain states in South America to support extensive claims
"4A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been
taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of
membership by the General Assembly. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored
by the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 5. A Member of the United Nations which has
persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the
Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. U.N.
CHARTER, art. 6.
'The General Assembly voted on December 17, 1970 to convene the Conference by a vote of
104 to I, with 16 abstentions. G.A. Res. 2750,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
" 6See note 87 supra.
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of national jurisdiction. The aversion of the Soviet Union to compulsory settlement of disputes may also present a problem.
From the annual reports made to the United Nations General Assembly by
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,' it is evident that all the proposals
herein discussed (i.e. the extension of exclusive national jurisdictions, the establishment of contiguous zones, of regional commissions and of an international
agency) are being discussed and considered in the preparation for the first
meeting of the Law of the Sea Conference in November 1973. It is hoped that
the Committee will find a workable proposal on the regulation of international
fisheries which can be presented for consideration and approval by both the
developed and developing nations and both the fishing and nonfishing nations
in attendance at the Conference.
In both the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences, there were so many
special issues which were introduced into the discussions that no resolution or
proposal on fishing jurisdictions or territorial seas was passed.,2' The world
community of nations should be able to set the machinery of reform into
motion before the world experiences a major crisis of its ocean fish resources
which would place the continued productive existence of the resources of the
sea and the food supply of the world in grave peril. If such a crisis is permitted
to occur by international inaction, it may then be too late to save the already
threatened resources of our seas.
John P. Rivers
12726U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971); 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/8721 (1972).
"'See "The United States Fish Industry and the 1958 and 1960 United Nations Conferences on
the Law of the Sea" (Panel Discussion: The Geneva Convention-Ten Years Later) in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 35 (June 1968).

